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Bulgarians, Georgians, and Moldovans vote later this month in elections that come at a decisive moment for all three countries.
Three key votes this month across Central and Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus have the potential to reshape politics in at least two of the countries heading for the polls (Georgia and Moldova), while in the third (Bulgaria), years of political stalemate look set to continue.
These three elections are critical not only for the respective countries but for the broader geopolitical picture in the region. The struggle between democratic reforms and authoritarian tendencies, European integration and Russian influence, is arguably at the heart of each contest.
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A win for pro-European forces in Georgia and Moldova would provide fresh momentum for democratic governance and EU integration. It would also signal the potential for further enlargement of the EU, a topic that has taken on increased urgency in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine. In both cases, pro-EU wins would likely mark a definitive and irreversible shift west.
In Bulgaria, the waters remain muddied. Already an EU member, the country’s growth has been hampered by its ongoing lack of a stable, permanent government, its long-held goal of joining the eurozone in 2025 now highly unlikely.
A European test in Chișinău
Moldova this month faces not one but two pivotal votes—a presidential election and a referendum on constitutional changes to accelerate its EU accession. Both elections will be held on October 20, with a second round of presidential elections two weeks later.
The country’s pro-European government, led by Prime Minister Dorin Recean and supported by President Maia Sandu, has been striving to pull Moldova away from the Russian orbit and closer to Brussels for some time.
The presidential election will be a test of support for Sandu’s leadership and her reformist vision for the country, while the EU referendum will gauge the public’s appetite for speedy integration into the European bloc. Polls suggest that Sandu is highly likely to prevail, while the EU referendum looks to be a foregone conclusion—Moldovans will choose Europe by a wide margin.
Nevertheless, with a nakedly pro-Russian opposition keen to capitalise on public discontent over poverty and corruption, few in the Moldovan capital are taking anything for granted.
Moscow has consistently sought to flex its muscles in Moldova, particularly through its breakaway region of Transnistria and by fostering political instability. However, the ongoing war in Ukraine has shifted the goalposts, with Moldova’s pro-European trajectory gaining momentum as a bulwark against Russian aggression in the region. The country, which has quite literally put itself on the map over the past two and a half years, “has had a very good war”, one Chișinău-based diplomat tells me.
Should Sandu emerge victorious, as appears likely, from these votes, it would send a clear signal to Brussels of the country’s commitment to reform and EU integration. It is unlikely, however, to end Russia’s ambitions—at least in the short term. Moscow will instead look towards next year’s parliamentary election (the outcome of which is not remotely as clear cut as the presidential vote and EU referendum) as a new opportunity to sow division.
In Sofia, a tired, disinterested electorate
Bulgaria’s parliamentary election on October 27 will be the country’s seventh in just three years, a sign of the deep political fragmentation and dysfunction that has plagued the country since 2021.
The standoff between reformist and establishment parties has paralysed progress on anti-corruption reforms and weakened confidence in state institutions, leading to widespread disillusionment with the political system.
The centre-right GERB party of a former prime minister, Boyko Borissov, is again expected to win, but will—again—fall well short of a majority. Broadly pro-EU, GERB has for years been mired in corruption scandals and offers little to the more reformist We Continue the Change/Democratic Bulgaria, which is likely to take second place.
A reluctant partnership between GERB and We Continue the Change/Democratic Bulgaria, agreed in 2023, fell apart within nine months. The pair look highly unlikely to work together again, at least while Borissov continues to play a leading role in GERB.
The failure of the two parties to work together, allied with voter apathy (less than a third of Bulgarians are expected to vote) has opened the way for the far-right Revival party, sympathetic to Russia, to make considerable ground. It could pip We Continue the Change/Democratic Bulgaria to second place, according to some recent polls.
This spells trouble. Bulgaria’s position as a member of both the EU and NATO, as well as its Black Sea location, makes its political trajectory crucial to European stability and cohesion.
A stable, reform-oriented government is crucial to advancing the country’s long-delayed judicial and anti-corruption reforms, but the wait for such a government appears likely to go on.
For Georgia, democracy or bust
In Georgia, parliamentary elections on October 26 will serve as a litmus test for the country’s democratic resilience and its long-term strategic direction.
Over the past decade, Georgia has been touted as a regional success story in terms of its aspirations for closer integration with the EU and NATO, economic growth, and openness to foreign investment.
However, democratic backsliding in recent years, growing political polarisation, and Moscow’s influence on the ruling Georgian Dream party have raised concerns over its trajectory.
Georgian Dream, which has held power since 2012, did a lot right in its early years, marrying a pro-business attitude with administrative reform and, in public at least, a pro-EU discourse that made membership of the bloc a real possibility.
Since 2022, however, the government’s ambivalent stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caused alarm in Western capitals and led to criticism that Tbilisi is drifting away from its pro-EU path. Recent legislation, such as a so-called ‘Russian law’ that severely limits the ability of the country’s NGOs to operate freely, have pushed Georgia further away from the EU.
In the run up to the election, Georgian Dream’s leaders (including founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, the country’s wealthiest person) have upped their anti-EU rhetoric, going so far as to suggest that a “global war party” was attempting to drag Georgia into conflict with Russia.
This time facing a resurgent and by Georgian standards, relatively united opposition, Georgian Dream is no longer guaranteed victory—as long as the election will be both free and fair. Many opposition figures fear it will be neither. In August, Georgian Dream vowed to outlaw virtually all of its political opponents if it wins the election.
A new government willing to implement democratic reforms and resist Russian influence would likely reassure Georgia’s Western partners. Any signs of electoral manipulation or further democratic decline will leave the country adrift.
Photo: Moldovan President Maia Sandu campaigning ahead of a presidential election on October 20. (Maia Sandu official Facebook page).
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